Vertical integration : applying an economic calculus to knowledge by van den Berg, Herman Anthony
Lakehead University
Knowledge Commons,http://knowledgecommons.lakeheadu.ca
Research and scholarly works Faculty of Business Administration
2005-01-19
Vertical integration : applying an
economic calculus to knowledge
van den Berg, Herman Anthony
Inderscience Publishing
International Journal of Learning and Intellectual Capital, 8:4 (2011)
http://knowledgecommons.lakeheadu.ca/handle/2453/782
Downloaded from Lakehead University, KnowledgeCommons
VERTICAL INTEGRATION: APPLYING AN 
ECONOMIC CALCULUS TO KNOWLEDGE 
 
Herman A. van den Berg 
Faculty of Information Studies 





   
2 
This paper applies an economic calculus to knowledge to address one of the most 
strategically important questions firms face – deciding which activities are more 
economically organized in a unified firm rather than in two autonomous firms.  The 
conceptual and empirical framework presented here proposes that specialization leads to 
differences in cost and technical efficiency of knowledge-based factors of production 
between adjacent stages in a value chain.  These divergent costs and technical efficiencies 
in turn shape the economics of inter-firm boundary location.   
A number of dimensions are suggested as being useful for distinguishing among the 
tacit, codified, and encapsulated forms of productive knowledge inputs.  Knowledge, so 
classified, is substituted for labour and capital as factors of production in the traditional 
microeconomic isocost-isoquant model.  The research framework being proposed implies 
that differences in knowledge-based factor intensities are instrumental in the 
determination of economic inter-firm boundary location. 
This paper is ground-breaking in its application of “an economic calculus to knowledge” 
(Simon, 1999: 34).  It recognizes that “there are [factor] markets for knowledge…” and 
uses “…marginal rates of substitution between one form of knowledge and another” in 
applying microeconomic theory (Simon, 1999: 24).  
Evidence for the propositions would imply that those making decisions regarding the 
location of inter-firm boundaries should give consideration to knowledge-based factor 
intensities in making their decisions to optimize firm performance.   
Evidence found supporting the propositions would reinforce previous research suggesting 
the existence of a secular trend of increasing vertical de-integration of industries over 
time. 
Introduction 
“We are increasingly concerned… with knowledge as a factor of 
production, having costs and values that we must try to estimate in 
order to make correct decisions for the conduct of business…  We 
have discovered that applying an economic calculus to 
knowledge… is often, because of… intangibility… far more 
difficult than costing and valuing… production machinery.  Yet, 
whether we can make the measurements accurately or not, it is 
precisely these costs and values that determine the efficiency and 
profitability of our activities…” (Simon, 1999: 34) 
The determination of economic inter-firm boundary location is a key strategic 
concern.  Correctly deciding which activities are more economically organized 
“in a unified firm (AB) rather than in two autonomous firms (A and B)” 
(Williamson, 1999: 1097) is no simple undertaking.  The question of firm 
boundary location is important since it attempts to predict the productive 
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activities a firm should undertake in-house, which products it should purchase 
or activities it should outsource, and when it should sell its product to the next 
segment of the value system1 (Pfaffmann, 1998).  This paper responds to that 
challenge in an innovative fashion by “applying an economic calculus to 
knowledge” (Simon, 1999: 34).  The conceptual and empirical framework 
presented here proposes that specialization leads to differences in cost and 
technical efficiency of knowledge-based factors of production between adjacent 
stages along a value chain.  These divergent costs and technical efficiencies in 
turn shape the economics of inter-firm boundary location. 
Simon’s (1999) urging to consider various forms of knowledge as factors of 
production in applying microeconomic theory may be considered somewhat 
novel.  In assessing the contribution of R&D to productivity growth, Griliches 
(1979: 95) introduced a production function that included “a measure of the 
current state of technological knowledge”.  Since then, the idea that “…there are 
markets for knowledge, with their supply and demand curves and marginal 
rates of substitution between one form of knowledge and another” (Simon, 1999: 
24) appears to have received scant attention.  
The framework constructed in this paper suggests that tacit, codified, and 
encapsulated forms of knowledge be considered as factors of production.  This 
differentiation appears to be foundational and is operational even when adjacent 
stages of production rely on common substantive knowledge.  Relative, rather 
than absolute, quantities of these factors of production will be gauged to reveal 
knowledge-based factor intensities, since agreement on what constitutes absolute 
quantitative measures of knowledge appears to be currently unobtainable 
(Down, 2000).  Knowledge-based factor intensities may be considered a 
modernization of the microeconomic concept of labour or capital factor 
intensities2 as traditionally applied in a manufacturing-based economy. 
Economics of Firm Knowledge 
The location of a boundary between upstream and downstream firms in a value 
system is a function of the marginal comparative advantages that emerge from 
knowledge specialization.  These comparative advantages are manifested as 
differences in the slopes of firms’ knowledge-based isoquant and isocost curves3.  
Comparative advantages surface as the relative abilities of firms engaging in 
knowledge-based activities increasingly specialize over time.  The divergence of 
abilities that result from knowledge specialization will be manifested in the 
divergence of relative costs of tacit, codified and encapsulated knowledge within 
and among firms (Jacobides, 2003). 
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For a given production function, the firm enjoying the minimum total cost of 
tacit, codified, and encapsulated knowledge will experience a comparative 
advantage.  This firm is expected to integrate those knowledge-based factors of 
production.  Upstream firms will sell to it and downstream firms will buy from it 
since they are at a comparative disadvantage in the production of the given good 
or service.  The assumption of market transactions presupposes that gains from 
trade in excess of transaction costs exist. 
Jacobides and Hitt (2003) have used a similar framework to empirically 
demonstrate that differences in productive capabilities along segments of a value 
system leads to dissimilar levels of vertical integration.  Productive capabilities 
were defined as “…rest[ing] on the firm’s general and specific knowledge…”  
(Jacobides and Hitt, 2003).  Their findings of the mortgage banking industry in 
the US, in which fully integrated and specialized de-integrated firms co-existed, 
“suggest that specialization is a function of the relative productive capabilities in 
different parts of the value [system]” (Jacobides and Hitt, 2003). 
Classification of Organizational Knowledge 
The knowledge used by a firm to generate value may be characterized as being 
tacit, codified, or encapsulated.  These three classifications of knowledge have 
been chosen based on differences in fundamental attributes that undergird all 
forms of substantive knowledge.  Table I layers Boisot’s (1998) three distinctions 
of knowledge over the tacit/explicit model suggested by Polyani (1966), Nonaka 
(1994), and Choo (1998), and the know-how/information model of Kogut and 
Zander (1992).  Knowledge residing in individual brains (Boisot, 1998) is equated 
to tacit knowledge (Choo, 1998, Polanyi, 1966, Nonaka, 1994), while explicit 
knowledge (Choo, 1998, Polanyi, 1966, Nonaka, 1994) is classified as being either 
codified as information or encapsulated in a physical artefact (Boisot, 1998).  
Similarly, know-how (Kogut and Zander, 1992) is classified as either residing in 
individual brains or nested in physical artefacts (Boisot, 1998).  The three 
classifications of knowledge displayed in Table I, tacit, codified, and 
encapsulated, will be used as knowledge-based factors of production. 
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Classification Tacit Knowledge Codified Knowledge Encapsulated Knowledge 
Boisot’s (1998) 
Knowledge residing in 
individual brains 
Knowledge codified as 
information 
Knowledge embodied 




Tacit knowledge Explicit knowledge Explicit knowledge 
Kogut and 
Zander (1992) 
Know-how Information Know-how (nested) 
Table I: Three Classifications of Knowledge 
It may be more useful to think of a given quantity of knowledge as having 
attributes or dimensions that place it closer to one classification than another, 
rather than rigidly categorizing it as belonging exclusively to one of these three 
classifications (Saviotti, 1998).  Table II provides a select number of dimensions 
that may be useful as an aid in the determination of the most fitting classification 
for distinguishing a specific assembly of knowledge. 
 






1998: 156)  
Human mind 
Signs, symbols, 
codes and display 
rules 
Concealed in an 
artefact’s design and 
technology; imbedded 






Hard to verbalize; requires 
“rich modes of discourse” 
(Choo, 2002: 265) and 
“physical co-presence” 
(Boisot, 1998: 46); costly to 
diffuse broadly 
Easy and low cost 





Speed, extent, and 
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Implicit in action-based 
skills (Polanyi, 1966) and 
conversation (Simon, 1999) 
Rules, routines and 
recipes based on a 
system of symbols 
(Nelson and Winter, 
1982) 




Experiencing and doing, 
observation and imitation, 
internship and 
apprenticeship. 
“…teachable even though 




codes, and displays; 
dependent on IPR 
regimes 

























Table II: Dimensions useful for Knowledge Classification 
Knowledge Boundaries as Firm Boundaries 
“Firms… form a pattern of economic organization that takes into 
account the need for acquiring knowledge in a more specialized 
fashion…”  The “vertical boundaries of a firm are determined by… 
the economics of conservation of expenditures on knowledge” 
(Demsetz, 1988: 160). 
Productivity and Specialization 
Firm productivity is enhanced through specialization, and firms, like 
individuals, can improve their economic prospects through specialization in 
knowledge acquisition (Demsetz, 1988, 1991).  The introduction of the notion that 
specialization is productive has been attributed to Adam Smith in his discussion 
of the division of labour among individual workers within a firm.  Demsetz 
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(1988, 1991) extends this idea to consider productive specialization among firms.  
Firms are “repositories of specialized knowledge and of the specialized inputs 
required to put this knowledge to work” (Demsetz, 1988: 158).  Hence, 
“Economic organization, including the firm, must reflect the fact that knowledge 
is costly to produce, maintain, and use [and that] …there are economies to be 
achieved through specialization” (Demsetz, 1988: 158).   Just as division of labour 
and leads to productivity increase, so too does division of knowledge lead to 
human capital deepening and economic efficiency. 
Grant (2002) concurs with Demsetz, on the economic imperative of specialization 
and also makes the link to knowledge.  The firm exists because it provides 
“conditions under which individuals can integrate their specialist knowledge” 
and because knowledge for production “requires greater specialization than is 
needed for its utilization” (Grant, 2002).  This difference between knowledge 
required to produce and knowledge required to use a product is termed the 
“fundamental asymmetry in the economics of knowledge” (Grant, 2002).  Grant 
goes so far as to claim that   “[t]he assumptions that there are gains from 
specialization in knowledge acquisition and storage, and that production 
requires the input of a wide range of specialized knowledge… is fundamental to 
all theories of the firm” (2002: 112) (emphasis added). 
Common Substantive Knowledge 
The observation that productive activities reliant on vastly different substantive 
knowledge occur in separate firms should surprise no one.  But, when 
productive activities relying on common substantive knowledge are adjacent to 
each other in an industry’s value system, it is a more subtle specialization that 
determines whether or not these activities are separated by inter-firm 
boundaries.  The research initiative being presented here suggests that this 
subtlety is may be ascribed to specialization leading to differences in the unique 
combinations of tacit, codified and encapsulated knowledge used as factors of 
production in adjacent stages.  Such differences may be captured by measuring 
variation in knowledge-based factor intensities of adjacent production and cost 
functions. 
The occurrence of a series of adjacent stages of production is commonplace in the 
complex productive value systems of many industries.  The decision to use 
adjacent stages in the research being proposed here ensures the presence of 
considerably more common knowledge than if the stages were not adjacent.  This 
has the effect of minimizing the probability that the presence of an inter-firm 
boundary is merely due to an inability to integrate vastly different knowledge 
domains.  Instead, it raises the likelihood that de-integration is driven by subtle 
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differences in the relative tacitness of related substantive knowledge.  The 
decision to focus on differences in knowledge-based factor intensities between 
adjacent stages of production along a value system also enhances the possibility 
that the research outcomes may be generalizable to other multi-stage industries.   
Research Questions 
What determines the location of a firm’s vertical boundaries?  How can 
differences in the economics of knowledge acquisition explain inter-firm 
boundary locations?  How can the nature of knowledge explain these 
differences? 
The theoretical background chosen to examine these overarching questions is the 
knowledge-based view of the firm (KBV).  In particular, Demsetz’s (1988) 
proposition that divergent knowledge acquisition costs are instrumental, 
Griliches’ (1979) and Simon’s (1999) promotion of knowledge as a factor of 
production, and Boisot’s (1998) three classifications of knowledge have been 
highlighted.  Specialization, expressed as differences in knowledge-based factor 
intensity, is posited to be instrumental in the formation of inter-firm boundaries 
along a value system with common substantive knowledge. 
It is anticipated that differences in the nature of knowledge, as expressed in 
Table II, can be demonstrated to be fundamental in shaping the differences in 
relative productivity of tacit, codified and encapsulated knowledge among 
adjacent stages of production.  While productive activity may generally be 
considered transformation of tacit knowledge into some form of explicit 
knowledge (Hedlund, 1994), few (if any) stages of production along a value 
chain are able to rely on exclusively on tacit, codified or encapsulated 
knowledge.  After all, “…there is a limit to the extent to which one factor of 
production can be substituted for another…”(Robinson, 1933: 330). 
Each stage along a value chain is expected to make use of that combination of 
factors which is uniquely most efficient (output maximizing while cost 
minimizing).  It is therefore expected that different combinations of tacit, codified 
and encapsulated knowledge inputs will be evident between adjacent stages of 
production.  
To research Demsetz’s (1988) assertion, tacit and explicit knowledge are 
substituted for labour and capital as factors of production in the traditional 
microeconomic isocost-isoquant model4 as shown in Figure 1.  As constructed, 
Figure 1 suggests that adjacent stages of production may be distinguished by 
comparative advantages in tacit or explicit knowledge input factors.5  The 
upstream stage, on the left side of the figure, has a comparative advantage in 
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production requiring a relatively higher quantity of tacit knowledge, while the 
downstream stage, on the right side of the figure, has a comparative advantage 
in production requiring a relatively higher quantity of explicit knowledge.  
Upstream production may be described as being more tacit knowledge intensive 
relative to the downstream production. 
 
Figure 1: Knowledge-Based Comparative Advantage 
Factor intensity is used to compare relative factor usage between stages.  If the 
quantity of tacit knowledge is given on the horizontal axis and the quantity of 
explicit (codified and encapsulated) knowledge is given on the vertical axis, then 
we can consider production in the upstream stage as tacit knowledge intensive 
relative to production in the downstream stage.  Consistent with microeconomic 
tradition, the negative inverse of the slope of the isocost and isoquant curves are 
termed, tacit knowledge intensity or TKI.6 
When cost is minimized for a given quantity of output, or when output is 
maximized for a given total cost, the slopes of the isocost curve and that the 
isoquant curve will be identical as at points “A” and “B” in Figure 1.  At other 
points along the isoquant curves, the slopes vary due to the law of diminishing 
marginal product.7  Therefore, to distinguish between the TKI of the cost of 
production (the negative inverse of the slope of the isocost line) and the TKI of 
the quantity of production (the negative inverse of the slope of the isoquant 
curve), they will be subscripted with “C” and “Q”, respectively. 
   
10 
The choice of relying on factor intensity as a relative quantitative measure in this 
research is deliberate.  While economists may generally agree on how quantities 
and costs of labour and capital may be measured, consensus on the measurement 
of absolute quantities and costs of tacit and explicit (codified and encapsulated) 
knowledge has yet to be achieved (Down, 2000).  By seeking to measure the 
relative reliance of a production or cost function on tacit versus codified versus 
encapsulated knowledge along the dimensions laid out in Table II, the 
intractability of obtaining absolute quantitative measures of these factors is 
circumvented. 
The following section formalizes the questions relating the location of vertical 
inter-firm boundaries to differences in the relative costs and productivity of tacit 
and explicit (codified or encapsulated) knowledge. 
Specialization 
In his seminal The Theory of the Firm Revisited, Demsetz (1988) suggests that firms 
exist to create economic value by lowering the cost of production of a good or 
service below the cost that is achievable through the self-provision of the same 
product by individuals or households.  Advantages in production costs stem 
from specialization of tasks which in turn stem from specialization of knowledge 
(Demsetz, 1988). 
The firm seen as an agreement to specialize (Demsetz, 1988, Grant, 2002), 
suggests different marginal rates of technical substitution among the various 
factors of production between adjacent production stages.  In other words, 
adjacent stages of production will operate on different isoquant curves, as 
modeled in Figure 1 due to differences between the unique production functions 
in upstream and downstream stages. 
Demsetz (1988) describes the boundaries of firms being located as a function of 
(i) low cost knowledge encapsulation (in production) on the part of the supplier, 
and (ii) low information costs (in product utilization) on the part of the consumer 
of such encapsulated knowledge.  Production of an intermediate product by an 
upstream firm at the minimum isocost for a given output of intermediate 
product corresponds to Demsetz’s (1988) reference to low cost encapsulation on 
the part of the supplier.  Similarly, production of the intermediate product by the 
upstream firm at the maximum isoquant is consistent with minimizing input 
costs for the downstream firm. 
Specialization in knowledge may emerge as differences in both TKIC and TKIQ 
between adjacent stages of production, reflecting differences in the relative cost 
of the factors and differences in the production function between stages.  This 
may be the case even when they share a common substantive knowledge.  
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Differences are expected to emerge in knowledge-based capabilities critical to 
sustaining a comparative advantage because their development is path 
dependent, firm-specific, and socially embedded, having evolved over some 
period of time (Dierickx and Cool, 1989, Barney, 1991).  It would therefore be 
reasonable to expect to measure differences in both TKIC and TKIQ along a value 
chain or system. 
The different slopes of the two isocost lines in Figure 2 indicated differences in 
TKIC between the upstream and downstream stages.  In Figure 2, the upstream 
production stage has relatively higher TKIC per unit of cost than the downstream 
firm.  While differences in factor intensity along a value system have been 
observed when the traditional microeconomic factors of labour and capital have 
been measured, differences in knowledge-based factor intensity have yet to be 
observed.  Therefore to empirically test the basic construction on which later 
hypotheses rest, the following is first proposed. 
Proposition 1:  The TKIC for a given cost of production differs between adjacent vertical 
stages in a value chain. 
 
Figure 2: Evidence of Specialization 
The different locations of the two isoquant curves in Figure 2 are also indicative 
of differences in TKIQ between the upstream and downstream stages.  In Figure 
2, the upstream production stage has relatively higher TKIQ per unit of product 
than the downstream firm suggesting that the two stages rely on different 
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production functions.  The upstream (downstream) product isoquant is drawn 
relatively closer to the horizontal (vertical) axis, demonstrating the requirement 
for relatively more explicit (tacit) knowledge for technically efficient production.  
To empirically test this construction more generally, the following is also 
proposed: 
Proposition 2:  The TKIQ for a given quantity of production differs between adjacent 
vertical stages in a value chain. 
While it would be surprising if evidence did not support these first two 
propositions, they are included for completeness and to form the basis for 
subsequent propositions. 
Production Efficiency 
The work of Demsetz (1988), Pfaffmann (2000, 1998) & Jacobides & Hitt (2003), 
suggests that the position of firms, both upstream and downstream of an inter-
firm boundary or market interface, will be selected so as to maximize their 
productive efficiencies along a value system.  While upstream and downstream 
firms sharing an inter-firm boundary will be engaged in complementary tasks 
due to their adjacency in the value system (Pfaffmann, 2000), they will be 
engaged in dissimilar tasks based on their specialized knowledge.  Due to their 
respective knowledge specialization, each firm will be able to enjoy a 
comparative advantage8 in the productive activities associated with its specialty. 
Argyres (1996) proposed that firms vertically integrate into those activities in 
which they had relatively superior capabilities and outsource those in which they 
have inferior capabilities.  He found support for his proposition in that lack of 
shared or intersecting knowledge between two adjacent activities in a value 
chain led to a boundary between them (Argyres, 1996).  One relatively tacit-
knowledge-based activity, mould-making, occurred in an upstream firm while 
the second relatively more formalized-knowledge-based activity, design 
engineering, was located in the downstream firm under study (Argyres, 1996).  
This example of vertical de-integration occurred despite “the molds’ complete 
customization and high cost imply[ing] high physical asset specificity” which 
would argue for vertical integration according to traditional transaction cost 
economic theory (Argyres, 1996: 137). 
It is expected from Argyres (1996), that products most efficiently produced with 
relatively higher levels of TKIQ (isoquant curves relatively closer to the 
horizontal axis than the vertical axis in Figure 1) will be produced by firms with 
relatively higher TKIC in input costs (flatter isocost lines), ceteris paribus.  This is 
depicted at point “A” of in the left-hand or upstream graph in Figure 1.  
Correspondingly, products most efficiently produced with relatively lower TKIQ 
   
13 
(isoquant curves relatively closer to the vertical axis than the horizontal axis in 
Figure 1) will be produced by firms with relatively lower TKIC in input costs 
(steeper isocost lines), ceteris paribus.  This is depicted at point “B” of the right-
hand or downstream graph in Figure 1. 
For the downstream producer to produce the upstream product it would have to 
incur higher total input costs, as would the upstream firm to produce 
downstream product.  Graphically, this would be represented by an isocost line 
for the downstream (upstream) firm, parallel to its current position and tangent 
to the upstream (downstream) product isoquant curve.  The new isocost curve 
would be above, or to the right of, the existing isocost line, indicating a 
combination of input factors with higher total costs.  The most economically 
efficient combination occurs when the upstream firm’s isocost line is just tangent 
to the upstream product’s isoquant at point “A”, while the downstream firm’s 
isocost line is tangent to the downstream product’s isoquant at point “B”.  In 
other words, the TKIQ for a given quantity of production for a given vertical 
stage in a value chain is expected to be positively correlated with the TKIC for the 
corresponding cost of production.  This aspect of the model can be hypothesized 
as: 
Proposition 3:   The higher the TKIQ for a given quantity of production in a vertical stage 
in a value chain, the higher will be the TKIC for the corresponding cost of production in 
that stage. 
For this hypothesis to hold, the vertical stages of production must be subject to 
the discipline of a competitive environment ensuring production efficiency in 
which quantities of production are maximized and cost of production are 
minimized.  The more efficient the production process, the less likely quantity 
will be below the optimal maximum (on an isoquant closer to the origin) and 
costs above the optimal minimum (on an isocost more distal from the origin).  
While not being tested directly, the extent to which Proposition 3 does not hold 
may be a function of systemic production inefficiencies rather than a lack of 
positive correlation between TKIQ and TKIC.  To avoid lack of competition being 
a confounding variable requires the selection of an industry in which 
competition is extensive. 
Vertical Integration or De-Integration 
Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004: 69) hypothesize that “Increasing marginal costs of 
knowledge integration within the firm imply that, where products require a 
broad range of different knowledge types, efficiency of integration is maximized 
through separate firms specializing different areas of knowledge…”  While 
evidence in support of the first two propositions may indicate that dissimilarity 
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in TKI can give explanation to differences observed along a value chain, it does 
not identify the location of inter-firm boundaries.  The magnitude of differences 
in TKIQ and TKIC found in adjacent vertical stages of a value chain are, however, 
expected to be reflective of the extent of specialization.  The size of differences in 
TKI are therefore posited to be determinant of whether or not adjacent stages of 
production are found to be integrated in one firm or separated in two.   
The benefits of specialization are reaped by firms who concentrate their efforts in 
those stages of production in which they have a comparative advantage while 
exiting those stages in which they are at a disadvantage.  One reason for 
separating adjacent stages that differ in TKI into separate firms is to avoid 
managerial diseconomies of scope (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967, Jacobides and 
Hitt, 2003).  Firm-wide application of common management practices, or 
dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), may hinder productivity in some 
stages of the value chain, where more focused management could enhance it 
(Jacobides and Hitt, 2003).  Inefficiencies due to diseconomies of scope move 
production isocost lines closer to the origin and tangent to lower isoquant curves. 
 
Figure 3: Probability of Integration based on Cost Function 
The left-hand graph in Figure 3 depicts the isocost curves of the upstream and 
downstream stages as being close to identical, indicating that TKIC for the two 
stages is similarly close to indistinguishable.  In such a case there would be 
relatively little difference in efficiency faced by either stage in producing tangent 
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to any given isoquant curve.  Faced with similar TKIs in cost of production, 
upstream and downstream stages could be economically integrated in a single 
firm. 
In the right-graph in Figure 3 however, the isocost curves are not similarly 
positioned.  The TKIC of the upstream producer is higher, indicating that this 
stage of production faces a relatively low cost of tacit knowledge.  Conversely, in 
the right-hand graph in Figure 3, the TKIC of the downstream producer is lower, 
indicating that this stage of production faces a relatively high cost of tacit 
knowledge.  One can easily imagine that only in rare circumstances would both 
isocost curves be equally efficient, with both being tangent to a given isoquant 
curve.  Faced with such differences in TKIC, there is less of a possibility that both 
stages of production will be found in a single firm.  Based on this construction, 
the following is proposed. 
Proposition 4:  The greater the difference in the TKIC for a given cost of production 
between adjacent stages in a value chain, the greater the probability that these stages will 
be separated by an inter-firm boundary. 
 
Figure 4: Probability of Integration based on Production Function 
Similarity of TKIQ for a given quantity of production, as reflected by the co-
location of the isoquant curves of both upstream and downstream products, 
argues for the vertical integration of the two stages of production in a single firm.  
If the upstream and downstream isoquants of adjacent stages of production are 
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nearly co-located, as depicted in the left-hand graph of Figure 4, it would 
indicate little dissimilarity in the TKIQ.  The less unique the combination of 
knowledge inputs of the adjacent stages’ production function, the greater the 
probable intersection of substantive knowledge associated with productive tasks.  
In the extreme, if the isoquants of adjacent upstream and downstream stages are 
nearly identical, it could indicate essentially no difference in underlying 
substantive knowledge.  In that case, one could expect of the two vertical stages 
of production to be combined in a single firm. 
The different locations of the upstream and downstream isoquants in the right-
hand graph of Figure 4 are indicative of two knowledge mature products.  
Knowledge maturity indicates that the substantive knowledge used in the 
production of the two products differs.  As a result, it is more economical for the 
downstream producer to purchase the specialized competences of the upstream 
firm as codified or encapsulated knowledge without having to acquire the 
underlying substantive knowledge (Pfaffmann, 1998, Pfaffmann, 2000).  
Similarly, it is more economical for the upstream firm to sell an intermediate 
product rather than develop it further through the downstream stage. 
The importance of the relative locations of upstream and downstream product 
isoquants in the determination of vertical integration may be formalized as 
follows. 
Proposition 5:  The greater the difference in the TKIQ for a given quantity of production 
between adjacent stages of a value chain, the greater the probability that the stages will be 
separated by an inter-firm boundary. 
Operation at the tangency of an isocost and isoquant by a firm presupposes that 
the firm is operating at close to perfect efficiency (i.e., correlation in Proposition 3 
= +1).  In reality, it is expected that firms will incur costs in excess of the 
theoretically efficient isocost, and produce at some volume slightly less than the 
theoretically efficient isoquant (i.e., correlation in Proposition > 0, and 
approaching 1).   
Dynamic Unbundling 
Jacobides (2003) argues that there has been little work to date, on explaining how 
markets linking two stages of the value chain arise.  According to Jacobides 
(2003: 1), “…neither institutional economists nor their critics study how or why 
intermediate markets emerge.  At the empirical level, there is scant research on the 
emergence of a ‘vertical discontinuity,’ an intermediate market.” 
As knowledge specialization progresses over time within firms, heterogeneity of 
productive capabilities appear through selection and replication processes 
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(Jacobides and Winter, 2003).  Gains from specialization as embodied in 
heterogeneous capabilities motivate organizational unbundling and the 
emergence of new markets (Jacobides and Winter, 2003, Jacobides, 2003).  
Unbundling requires “simplification of coordination between different parts of 
the value chain, and the standardization of information that needs to be 
exchanged between them” (Jacobides, 2003: 2-3).  Balconi (2002) suggests that 
codification and encapsulation in computer-based technology leads to vertical 
de-integration, while Macher and Mowery (forthcoming, 2004) associate industry 
maturation in computers and chemicals industries with technical standardization 
and codification of formerly tacit knowledge.  Standardization changes factor 
intensities: tacit knowledge intensity falls as production processes are made 
explicit over time. 
 
Figure 5: Dynamic Unbundling of Production Function 
Jacobides (2003), and Jacobides and Winter (2003) suggests that isoquant curves 
in adjacent stages of a value chain drift apart over time as a result of knowledge 
specialization, while Macher and Mowery (forthcoming, 2004) suggest that this 
drift will be up and to the left for at least one stage’s isoquant.  Using the two 
graphs in Figure 5, for example, this could be represented by showing the 
upstream and downstream isoquant curves being initially co-located and then 
drifting apart to their new locations.  The phenomenon of dynamic unbundling 
may be formally hypothesized as follows. 
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Proposition 6:  Over time, differences in the TKIQ for a given quantity of production will 
increase between adjacent stages of a value chain. 
 
Figure 6: Dynamic Unbundling of Cost Function 
If TKIC for costs and TKIQ for quantities of production continue to be positively 
correlated through the dynamic unbundling as hypothesized in Proposition 3, 
then the isocost lines and isoquant curves will remain tangent as at points “A” 
and “B” on the graphs in Figure 1.  This would imply that as isoquant curves 
drift, the most cost efficient combination of factor inputs would also change as 
depicted in Figure 6.  This tendency to drift may be formally hypothesized as: 
Proposition 7:  Over time, differences in the TKIC for a given cost of production will 
increase between adjacent stages of a value chain. 
Performance Effects 
In most industries there will be some heterogeneity of performance in any given 
stage of production.  An examination of factor intensities may shed some light on 
the cause of such heterogeneity.  Proposition 3 suggests that TKIC and TKIQ in 
each stage of a value chain will be positively correlated in a competitive 
environment.  Less than perfect positive correlation ( < +1) implies either 
production costs in excess of the economic minimum (operation on an isocost 
more distant from the origin) or production quantities below the technical 
maximum (operation on an isoquant closer to the origin).  It is therefore probable 
   
19 
that performance in any stage of a value chain will be positively correlated with 
the correlation of TKIC and TKIQ in that stage.  This can be formally hypothesized 
as: 
Proposition 8:  The greater the degree of correlation between TKIC and TKIQ in a stage of 
a value chain the greater will be its performance. 
In many industries we also observe two vertically adjacent stages of production 
integrated in a single firm in some cases and simultaneously de-integrated in two 
vertically separated firms in other cases.  Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that 
vertically adjacent stages in a value chain are more likely to be found separated 
by an inter-firm boundary as their TKIC and TKIQ diverge.  Integration of 
adjacent stages of a value chain into a single firm when their TKIC and TKIQ are 
divergent implies a lack of efficiency as Proposition 3 no longer holds for one or 
both of the stages.  Similarly, de-integration of adjacent stages when their TKIC 
and TKIQ are equivalent could indicate potential loss of economies of vertical 
integration.  Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that, to the extent that 
adjacent stages are not integrated or de-integrated as hypothesized in 
Propositions 4 and 5, they will be performing at sub-optimal levels. 
Birkinshaw, Nobel and Ridderstråle (2002) found evidence for their hypotheses 
that characteristics of knowledge are important predictors in the determination 
of inter-unit integration in R&D organizations.  However, evidence that 
alignment between knowledge characteristics and organizational structure was 
related to performance  was more ambiguous (Birkinshaw et al., 2002).  They 
caution however, that the results of their study should be seen as exploratory 
and not necessarily generalizable to other settings (Birkinshaw et al., 2002). 
Bontis, Crossan & Hulland (2002) found support for the proposition that the 
misalignment of stocks and flows in an overall organizational learning system is 
negatively associated with business performance.  The research utilized the 
constructs developed in Crossan, Lane & White (1999) in which individual and 
group level learning roughly correspond to tacit knowledge, organizational level 
learning translated into routines, prescribed practices and information 
corresponds to codified knowledge, and organization level learning, embedded 
in new products and structures, essentially corresponds to encapsulated 
knowledge.  Misalignment is described as possibly being attributable to a flawed 
organizational structure. 
Given the mixed results of previous studies, the relationship between the 
alignment of knowledge and structure to performance will be analyzed as 
follows. 
   
20 
Proposition 9:  The greater the degree of correlation of vertical de-integration to 
differences in TKIC and TKIQ between adjacent stages of a value chain, the greater will be 
their performance. 
Conclusions and Implications 
The conceptual framework set out in this paper provides the basis for an 
empirical investigation into the key strategic issue of vertical firm boundary 
location.  The proposed research aims to answer the challenge posed by 
Williamson (1999: 1097)  to demonstrate why some activities are better organized 
“in a unified firm (AB) rather than in two autonomous firms (A and B)” and vice 
versa, by “applying an economic calculus to knowledge” (Simon, 1999: 34).  The 
basic premise is that specialization leads to differences in knowledge-based 
factor intensities which are determinative in economic inter-firm boundary 
location. 
A number of contributions are expected to derive from this research.  First, it 
provides a framework for empirically testing Demsetz’s (1988) assertion that 
differences in the cost of knowledge across a vertical inter-firm boundary are 
causal in boundary creation.  Second, it seeks to provide evidence that variations 
in the cost and productivity of knowledge-based factors along a value chain 
originate from differences in the nature of knowledge.  Third, the research will 
encourage the development of an instrument to measure relative differences in 
knowledge-based factor intensity along a value chain.  Fourth, it should provide 
evidence that differences in the nature of knowledge employed along a value 
chain impacts the location of inter-firm boundaries.  Fifth, the research should 
provide evidence that progressive specialization in knowledge along a value 
chain causes increased vertical de-integration over time.  Finally, it should 
provide evidence that the ‘correct’ application of knowledge-based criteria in the 
setting of inter-firm boundaries impacts firm performance. 
The expected results of the research suggested in this paper have a number of 
practical and theoretical implications.  On the practical side, the results would 
suggest that firms adopt a knowledge-based view in making their ‘make-or-buy’ 
and ‘sell-or-develop further’ decisions, and that firms will be rewarded for 
making decisions on this basis.  It would also suggest that firms should expect to 
see their value chain de-integrate over time as a natural outcome of the 
specialization of products and production processes. 
On the theoretical side, this research will extend the knowledge-based view of 
the firm in the discipline of strategic management.  Perhaps most significantly 
however, it will assist in the legitimization of “applying an economic calculus to 
knowledge” (Simon, 1999: 34) in KBV strategy. 
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[1] A value system is the term used to describe a series of firms’ value chains, where upstream 
suppliers are linked by markets to downstream buyers.  A firm’s competitive advantage depends 
not only on its ability to create value or reduce cost in its own value chain relative to competing 
firms, but also on the value-creating and cost-reducing abilities of the other firms in the value 
system.  A value chain is a set of interrelated generic activities common to a wide range of firms.  
The goal of these activities is generate a profit by creating value that exceeds the cost of providing 
a product (good or service).  These primary value-creating activities are facilitated by less linear, 
more pervasive, support activities.  Value chain analysis involves the identification of firm-
specific activities, and the process flows that link them.  Understanding these activities and how 
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the performance or cost of one activity affects the others can illuminate opportunities for 
obtaining or improving a competitive cost or differentiation advantage.  [Porter, M. E. (1985) 
Competitive Advantage, Free Press, New York, Porter, M. E. (1980) Cometitive Strategy, Free Press, 
New York.] 
[2] Labour (capital) factor intensity is the relative importance of labour (capital) versus capital 
(labour) or other factors in production, and is usually compared across firms, industries and 
nations.   Factor intensities may be defined by ratios of factor quantities employed or by marginal 
rates of substitution between factors. 
[3] Isoquant curves display combinations of factors of production that generate the same total 
quantity of output.  Isocost curves display combinations of factors of production that incur the 
same total cost.  When a firm operates on an isocost curve just tangent to an isoquant curve, it 
does so at the lowest possible total cost.  Correspondingly, when a firm produces on the isoquant 
curve furthest from the origin and just tangent to its isocost curve, it maximizes output at a given 
cost.  The slope of a firm’s two-factor isocost curve is the negative of the price ratio between the 
two factors.  The slope of a firm’s two-factor isoquant curve is the negative of the marginal rate of 
technical substation between the two factors.  A Pareto efficient production solution occurs when 
the price ratio between two factors equals the marginal rate of technical substitution. 
[4] In two dimensions, an isocost curve shows combinations of two factors of production or inputs 
that generate the same total cost.  An isoquant curve depicts combinations of two factors of 
production or inputs that generate the same total output.  A firm produces a given output at the 
lowest possible cost by operating where an isocost curve is just tangent to the isoquant curve for 
that level of output.  Similarly, a firm produces at the highest possible technical efficiency by 
operating where an isoquant curve is just tangent to the isocost curve for that level of cost.  The 
slope of an isocost curve is the negative of the ratio of the price of the factor on the horizontal axis 
to the price of the factor on the vertical axis.  Similarly the slope of an isoquant curve is the 
negative of the marginal product of the factor on the horizontal axis divided by the marginal 
product of the factor on the vertical axis.  This slope is called the marginal rate of technical 
substitution of the factor on the vertical axis for the factor on the horizontal axis.  At the efficient 
solution, the price ratio and the marginal rate of technical substitution between the two factors 
are equal. 
[5] To simplify the construction of Figure 1, knowledge-based production factors have been 
limited to two; the classifications of codified knowledge and encapsulated knowledge were 
collapsed into a single factor, explicit knowledge.  In operationalization of the research, codified 
knowledge and encapsulated knowledge are expected to be treated as separate and distinct input 
factors owing to important differences as dimensionalized in Table II.  Choices between the 
employment of codified or encapsulated knowledge are considered to be strategically significant 
because of these differences. 
[6] See previous footnote. 
[7] The law of diminishing marginal product states that increases in an input, holding all other 
inputs constant, will result in lower marginal product.  In other words as the quantity of one 
factor of production is increased, while all other factors are held constant, at some point the rate 
of increase in product will diminish. 
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8 If there is more than one way to produce an output, firms can exploit comparative advantages 
[Varian, H. R. (2003) Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, Norton, New York.].  The 
law of comparative advantage states that producers will specialize in the production of goods 
and services for which they have the lowest marginal opportunity cost.  Comparative advantage 
was shown by David Ricardo to be more generally applicable than absolute advantage [Ricardo, 
D. (1817) On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.].  Even if one of two parties to a 
potential market exchange has an absolute advantage in the production of both two products to 
be traded, that party can still increase its utility beyond that available at its production possibility 
frontier by specializing in the production of that good or service in which it has a comparative 
advantage, and trading for that in which it has a comparative disadvantage. 
